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The neoconservative influence on American foreign policy has not had an enthusiastic
response outside the United States. Its failure to bring peace and democracy to Iraq has
now resulted in a spate of critiques in America itself, even from within the policy
establishment. The highest-level defection has been that of Francis Fukuyama, author of
The End of History and the Last Man (1992), the paean to the triumph of capitalism that
became a canonical neoconservative text of the 1990s, articulating the transition from the
Clinton administration to that of George W. Bush. In his new book, After the Neocons,
Fukuyama argues that key neoconservative tenets were systematically violated in making
the case for the war in Iraq, and, further, that the broader attempt to combat terror is illserved not only by the war but also by the neoconservative project of democratic reform
in the Middle East. The failure of these projects, he argues, is a phenomenon less of the
Middle East than of the disoriented modernity of Muslims in the West – Western Europe
particularly. In conclusion, he offers a replacement for neoconservative foreign policy,
something that he calls “realistic Wilsonianism”.
The arguments over Fukuyama’s new book have not just been among conservative thinktank intellectuals. Soon after publication the White House itself entered the brawl,
sending emails citing contradictions between Fukuyama’s past statements and the
positions taken in his new book, particularly his support in 1998 for the forcible
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. As Tod Lindberg, Editor of the Hoover Institution’s
Policy Review, put it, the Bush administration has been “more influenced by Mr.
Fukuyama’s work than by that of any other living thinker”.
On the sidelines, liberal commentators and reviewers in the United States have watched
with a mixture of righteousness and glee the long-awaited conservative crackup over the
ideological basis of the Bush administration’s foreign policy.

The End of History and the Last Man began as an article written while Fukuyama was at
the Rand Corporation, the quintessential Cold War think tank. Written in the flush of
victory and the collapse of Soviet Communism, it argued that the world was at a
historical moment in which history itself – at least “history” in the sense of fundamental
arguments over political ideology – was essentially over. Liberal democracy, market
capitalism, and the welfare state had won, both because they were right in principle and
because they had been proven right in practice, while their twentieth-century totalitarian,
collectivist competitors – Communism, Nazism and Fascism – had all been seen off. The
End of History was, then, a disquisition on the end of alternatives to liberal democratic
capitalism, at least those alternatives that sprang from the modernizing project. The book
did not consider the possibility of a challenge from outside the realm of modernity as
understood in the West. Islam is mentioned only in passing.
Much of the anger directed at Fukuyama by neoconservatives and by Bush administration
intellectuals since the publication of After the Neocons arises from the perception that he
intended The End of History to be a universal pronouncement, applicable across the span
of world history, not limited merely to the ideologies of modernity. In his new book
Fukuyama makes no retraction; he claims rather to have been misread. His argument was
never meant to be universal, he says, and it is the fault of the neocons for not recognizing
the limits of what a policy of promoting democracy and liberalism in the Middle East can
– and cannot – get you.
In the years after the publication of The End of History, the neoconservatives in foreign
policy held the line that the basic institutions and values of democracy, human rights,
liberalism, free markets and the emancipation of women were accepted worldwide and
not open to question. Fukuyama himself moved on: in Trust: The social virtues and the
creation of prosperity (1996), he fleshed out certain of the cultural values that made
liberal capitalism work; in State-Building: Governance and world order in the 21st
century (2004), he addressed the problem of failed states; and in Our Posthuman Future:
Consequences of the biotechnology revolution (2003), he considered how to avoid yet
another modern dystopia.
During the early Bush years, as liberal and conservative thought in America became
increasingly polarized, Fukuyama and other conservative thinkers continued to set the
tone of the administration. Meanwhile, elsewhere in the world, as we now know,
intellectuals with a very different idea were also at work. They too had a global political
vision; but theirs was a dream, not of the end of history, but of a rebirth, a resumption of
the long march of Islam, stalled by centuries of Western expansion but reinvigorated by
contemporary global demography. The true challenge to neoconservative foreign policy
came, not from liberals on the Potomac, but from armed theocrats in the Old World. The
Islamist project is a paradoxical vision of history simultaneously old and new, premodern
in its deployment of ancient Islamic doctrines but postmodern in its highly selective use
of them. It borrows notions from the heart of Western thought – multiculturalism, anticolonialism, ressentiment – but in the service of a radical alternative to secular liberal
capitalism. Like Fukuyama himself, Islamists have an end-time ideology – in their case

not a secular, democratic, civil society writ global, but the worldwide umma, as
prescribed in the Koran. For a crucial period of time, the Islamist vision was almost
invisible to the West, even as it was under elaboration; articulated in another language, in
Arabic rather than English, its audience was not in think tanks in Washington but among
the resentful leftovers of modernity in immigrant communities in the cities of Europe.
The ascendancy of the Islamist alternative is the test for both liberal and neoconservative
thinking. And After the Neocons can be seen as an oblique response to it, one that
attempts to set American foreign policy on a new course. The history of neoconservatism
it offers, both internally and in its relation to other American approaches to foreign
policy, is fair-minded and sober. Fukuyama is helpful, for example, in gently dismissing
the tendency of the American Left today to discern conspiracies around those who
studied several generations back with the University of Chicago’s Leo Strauss, a
classicist whose dense theorizing on the questions of truth and relativism is only
tangentially related to contemporary political theory. Richard Hofstadter’s “paranoid
style” in American politics is not limited to the Right, a truth amply demonstrated by
arguments prevalent in the Left intellectual blogosphere today that purport to reveal
Straussianism as the Da Vinci Code of the Bush administration.
As a positive political doctrine, Fukuyama says, neoconservatism is one of four principal
approaches to American foreign policy. The other three are: first, realism in the mould of
Kissinger, which emphasizes power and stability, and tends to downplay the internal
nature of other regimes; second, liberal internationalism, which hopes to transcend power
politics and move to “an international order based on law and institutions”; and finally, in
Walter Russell Meade’s term, “Jacksonian” nationalism, tending to a security-related
view of American national interests and distrust of multilateralism.
What characterizes neoconservatism in comparison to the others in this schema?
Fukuyama answers by laying out a number of interconnected propositions that, as he
says, form neoconservatism’s fundamental ideological base. It arose, he argues, as a
highly specific moralizing doctrine for promoting American security in the ideological
struggles of the Cold War. In the late Cold War, it played idealist antagonist to
Kissingerian realism. More precisely, it opposed the Kissingerian realism embraced by
Nixon and Ford, a doctrine that preached accommodation to the “inevitable” appeal and
spread of Communism. This doctrine of “declinism” was endorsed both by the endlessly
cynical Nixon and hopelessly naive Carter, and only decisively rejected (to the
amazement and derision of most of America’s elites, whether cynical or naive) by the
great hero of the neoconservative movement, Ronald Reagan.
Fukuyama’s next point is that although neoconservatism is about “security” in the broad
sense of preserving America, both its power and its ideals, it is not about power alone, or
the maintenance of state-to-state realist stability. It is, rather, a belief in the power of
ideas, ideals and ideology as necessary conditions of victory in the Cold War, an
understanding that Pope John Paul II was as necessary to the victory over Communism as
Nato’s battalions were. Finally, he says, neoconservatism asserts that the internal affairs
of states – their attachment to democracy, human rights and liberal values – are overall

indicators of external state behaviour; predictors, even if imprecise ones, of their
tendencies to war and peace. And neoconservatism conjoins simultaneously a belief in
the universal validity and appeal of fundamental American ideals with an equally firm
belief in American exceptionalism.
After the Cold War, neoconservatism asserted the special legitimacy of American power.
It was unapologetic about using this for moral and idealist purposes. Sometimes these
purposes directly involved US security interests, such as in the case of the Cold War
itself. Sometimes, it was asserted, force could be used in defence of basic propositions of
international order, such as the defence of Kuwait in the first Gulf war. In the
neoconservative view America was also entitled to act internationally from morality
alone, when its security was not directly at stake. Thus it was primarily neoconservatives
who made the case, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, for armed action in
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo and, today, Darfur.
Fukuyama points out that neoconservatism shares with American realism an abiding
scepticism regarding international institutions, at least those, such as the United Nations,
that go beyond a certain minimum state-centred multilateralism, while invoking highminded visions of global governance and the decline of sovereignty. Neoconservatives
adopt the realist critique that, whatever countries may say in relation to international
institutions, they do not, in fact, act on their own pronouncements. Neocons also go a step
further, into the realm of ideals, and argue that democratic sovereignty, and America’s
democratic sovereignty in particular, is an ideal also, one with its own moral legitimacy,
and that insofar as international institutions seek to undermine that sovereign democracy,
they are wrong in principle.
Fukuyama has one final proposition about neoconservatism, one crucial to his argument
that the Iraq war was a betrayal of neoconservative principles. This is based, though,
more in the experience of domestic politics than international relations. It is what he
characterizes as a profound “distrust of ambitious social engineering projects”. The
untoward consequences of ambitious efforts at social planning, he writes, are a
“consistent theme in neoconservative thought that links the critique of Stalinism in the
1940s with . . . skepticism about the Great Society in the 1960s”.
The previous half-dozen of his propositions hang together as the lessons of victory in the
Cold War. To what extent, he asks, are these lessons the right guide to the US to war in
Iraq and, more generally, the “war” on terror? Are they not rather a case of fighting the
wrong war, the ideological equivalent of the oft-noted tendency of generals to pursue the
tactics used in the previous conflict, all too often with disastrous results? His final
proposition focuses attention on an inconsistency within the neoconservative world-view:
the belief that engineering democracy in Iraq could be achieved simply by the external
device of forcibly removing the dictator and that it could be pursued without
unanticipated negative consequences.
According to Fukuyama, a misinterpretation of neoconservative principles led the Bush
administration to refight the last war – ie, the war on Communism – mistakenly believing

that the Iraq war would fundamentally have the same result, a release of pent-up social
and cultural demand for democracy, capitalism, civil society and the rule of law. It should
have been clear that the social and cultural pressures for democracy and so on in Eastern
Europe were the result of very long-term conditions simply not present in the Arab
Middle East. Thus, in releasing the grip of the dictator, the US opened the door for forces
of sectarian, tribal and other causes of violence and, potentially, civil war. These were not
in the lexicon of anticipated consequences because neoconservatives had mistakenly
drawn their template from the fundamentally Western cultural examples of Europe and
modernity. This aspect of Fukuyama’s argument has occasionally been unfairly
characterized as racist, a lesser-breeds-without-the-law view of the Arab world. What it is
really is realist, urging caution on moralist action. It entails the recognition that liberal
democracy emerges from particular long-term social and cultural matrices and cannot
simply be enacted through elections, and a further recognition that democracy itself is a
fragile social condition even where it exists, and that its underlying conditions can be
destroyed far more quickly than they can be created. It is a conservative critique of
neoconservatism that points to a contradiction within neoconservative moral assumptions.
It is, perhaps, not precisely realist, in the sense of citing narrow national interest or state
stability; it is, rather, the position of a moral realist.
Fukuyama’s view of these things, it may be noted, itself shows inconsistencies. In The
End of History he was something of a Hegelian triumphalist. In the present book, he
displays Burkean caution, if not outright pessimism. It may be his discomfort over having
changed his mind that accounts for the peculiar fact that Burke, despite hovering above
nearly every substantive critique Fukuyama makes of neoconservative triumphalism,
barely figures in the actual text of After the Neocons.
What does Fukuyama’s farewell to his former companions in arms mean for the debate
over the Iraq war? On the Left, many have abandoned their traditional Wilsonian
idealism to revel in a mean-spirited realism usually associated with the Right, opposing
the Iraq war not just on the legitimate grounds that it was not likely to achieve its aims
and risked creating something worse – but in the course of this, culpably downplaying the
evil that Saddam did. Recall how during the 1990s, it was taboo in liberal circles in the
United States, Canada, or Western Europe even to suggest that the Balkan wars might be
the result of centuries-old ethnic hatreds. That was wicked conservative realism voiced
by morally indifferent Republicans such as Brent Scowcroft, and denounced with
eloquence by progressive internationalists such as Michael Ignatieff and Samantha
Power. I made speeches to this effect myself when I worked for Human Rights Watch –
insisting, with Kantian moral certainty, that wars are never ascribable to ancient ethnic
hatreds (Yugoslavia), and that there can be no peace without justice (Sierra Leone), and
that impunity always rebounds (Chile). The progressive position was that ascribing the
Yugoslav wars to ancient ethnic hatreds rather than the manipulations of present-day
politicians was an immoral and cynical ploy to avoid getting involved. Today, on the
other hand, a card-carrying liberal realist such as the Democratic Party’s Kos Moulitsas
can write, “It’s clear that in the Middle East, no one is sick of the fighting. They have
centuries of grudges to resolve, and will continue fighting until they can get over them”.
Meanwhile Saddam Hussein seems to be being reinvented on the Left as merely another

minor bad guy in a courtroom that offers him insufficient procedural protections. That
Iraq today is worse than Iraq yesterday may of course actually be true, although it seems
to me in fact far from so.
Or it might yet turn out to be true. But the downgrading of human rights idealism and the
embrace of Kissingerian realism in the matter of Iraq is ill-becoming to American
liberals. It is as though they had been long constrained to worship at the church of pious
Wilsonianism, and were now suddenly freed to go out into the streets for a carnival of
realism, suddenly freed to expound on the virtues of containment, stability and national
interest.
Fukuyama has a great deal to say about the neoconservative run-up to the Iraq war. In
this he is consistent: he opposed it from the beginning. Perhaps his Burkean instincts,
deriving from the work he had done since 2000 on the rigours of state-building and the
profound difficulties of creating from scratch conditions for democracy in the world
outside Eastern Europe, began to kick in. Neoconservatives who applauded The End of
History seem not to have read his books on nation-building and international
development.
Fukuyama is largely right, it seems to me, in his critique of naive neoconservatism and its
belief that the liberation of Eastern Europe would repeat itself in Iraq. But it is not
necessarily correct to credit these neocons with the administration’s policy in Iraq. They
were a crucial part of the coalition for war within the Bush administration. But essential
figures, and leading proponents of the war, notably Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld,
are better described, using Fukuyama’s chosen category, as conservative Jacksonian
nationalists. Traditional conservative realists like Scowcroft and Kissinger said no to the
neoconservative venture; while the conservative Jacksonian nationalists said yes. This
was a crucial difference. Neither can be characterized as idealist or moralist.
And there is a piece missing from Fukuyama’s account of the Bush administration’s war
coalition. It is the transformation of at least some of these realists – or Jacksonian
nationalists – into fully fledged neoconservatives, that is, the convergence of realism and
idealism. A case in point is Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, who started out as a
realist protégé of Scowcroft but emerged as an ardent proponent of what we may
characterize as the Bush doctrine, holding that the pursuit of democracy and universal
values is itself a realist strategy. This school of thought argues that old realist doctrines of
containment, accommodation, stability and narrow national interest are what got us into
the current predicament; and that only a greater vision can get us out. Idealism – and this
is a phrase which has appeared repeatedly in conservative defences of the Iraq war – is
the new realism. On this view, which should be distinguished from naive
neoconservatism, war for regime change and democratic transformation becomes, in the
instrumentalist calculus of realists, a calculated bet on the possibilities of political
transformation, one magnified by the perceived threat of transfer of WMD technology.
Different people may weigh the probabilities differently, make different estimations,
arrive at different bets, including the bet on doing nothing much at all. It was on this basis
that I, for one, supported and continue to support the Iraq war, and it seems to me an

argument that Fukuyama conspicuously fails to address. It is not that Fukuyama slays a
straw man – there were indeed plenty of naive neoconservatives, presumably now much
chastened by events – but there are also plenty of not-so-naive realist-into-idealists for
whom the outcome of the bet remains very much undecided.
Fukuyama has a second argument against the Iraq war and against transformative politics
as a strategy in the war on terror. Drawing on such writers as Olivier Roy, he argues that
democratic regime transformation in the Middle East will not address the problem of
Islamist extremism and terrorism, because they are phenomena not principally of the
Middle East, but of Muslims in the West confronting the loss of identity. Even assuming
that the transformative strategy managed to stabilize Iraq, he argues, the social precursors
of terrorism are not to be found there. They are drawn from places we cannot attack with
military force – Hamburg, London, the Parisian banlieues. Thus the phenomenon of
Islamist terror is not a regional, political or even sociological problem; it is, rather, the
accumulation of individual psychologies, massed together in shared and yet still highly
individual narratives of resentment, exclusion and the search for Muslim social and
economic integration, and particularly Muslim middle-class integration, within European
pluralist modernity. Even if the birthplaces of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi Arabia and
Egypt, this argument runs, their jihadist spiritual formation was in Western Europe. The
Bush administration launched, on this account, a war that missed the point, targeting the
wrong region and the wrong country.
I would not wish to deny the strength of Fukuyama’s psychological observations. They
are an indispensable part of any deep understanding of the esprit de corps of the terrorists.
They are a powerful prescription, in my view, for deep-seated ideological changes in
Western societies and their states, though perhaps not the changes that Fukuyama has in
mind. The changes they indicate the need for, I would argue, involve the explicit
abandonment of the doctrines of multiculturalism in Western societies, doctrines that
have so damaged and weakened them. They are an argument for a vigorous reassertion of
traditional liberalism, above all its guarantees of free expression, even for blasphemy, and
of a traditional liberal refusal to tolerate the intolerant.
At some point, Europe and America will have to defend more vigorously – in the face of
the cultural challenge of Islamism and other violent fundamentalisms, their broadly
liberal inheritance (in America, liberal pluralism, to be precise, rather than liberal
secularism, descended from European anticlericalism). The core of that defence is a clear
attitude to religious extremism. Islam – “moderate” Islam – must take its place alongside
other religions. That is to say, it must dwell within the cage of tolerance, an iron cage that
insists without apology that religions tolerate the liberal secular order of public life.
Muslim communities in the West must know that the larger society will not compromise
its demands that all respect the values of a liberal society; they must also know that they
will be protected with force against the demands of extremists from within their own
community.
Fukuyama’s psychological argument, important though it is, does not dispose of the
argument for forcible regime change, nor for the attempt to open possibilities for
democratic transformation in the Middle East. The story is not all about Muslims in the

West. The ancillary roles of corrupt, authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes that prop
themselves up with religious ideology and of Saudi-financed Wahhabism cannot be
discounted. No doubt the push for democracy in the region will produce unanticipated
consequences. One that has already been anticipated, by the Egyptian legal scholar
Hesham Nasr among others, is the rise of Islamist parties and sharia law among
populations which, having seen the failure of socialism and neo-liberalism to better their
lives, are willing to give at least parliamentary Islamism a chance. The issue, Nasr points
out, is not so much whether they should be allowed to give it a try, but whether, having
tried it and perhaps not liking it, they will still have a political system that allows them to
give it up. How, he asks, does a society give up God’s own legal system?
Fukuyama’s last argument, his answer to what post-neoconservative policy should be, is
less persuasive than his earlier critique of it. He calls for a new foreign policy paradigm, a
hard-headed liberal internationalism that he calls “realistic Wilsonianism”. The
terminology seeks to combine idealist and realist strands. The deep contradictions of
neoconservative foreign policy, he says, can only be addressed by a renewed and
invigorated multilateralism. First, he proposes, the United States should “work toward a
multilateral world, not give special emphasis to the United Nations”. He locates the
source of multilateral legitimacy not in UN institutions but in a looser configuration, one
more tightly multilateral than US-led coalitions of the willing, but less so than the UN.
Second, Fukuyama argues that the goal of foreign policy should not be the
“transcendence of sovereignty and power politics but its regularization through
institutional constraints”.
In practice, what Fukuyama describes is the old, familiar liberal internationalism with a
bit less emphasis on existing international organizations. What is hard-headed about this,
I wonder? In practice it would be likely to amount to a multilateralism that empowered
the middling powers of Europe. This is counsel that will warm the hearts of many in
Europe and many on the American Left, but not mine. And it is quite disconnected from
Fukuyama’s earlier argument. “Realistic Wilsonianism” seems to be born of a desire to
find a new paradigm – any paradigm – that will constrain American neo-conservatism
from further action. It is not so much a solution to neoconservative contradictions as an
effort to quarantine them.
Events since the book was written do not make this prescription any more germane.
Today, with the recent conflict in Lebanon, we have entered a new phase of foreign
policy in which seemingly nothing but the hardest realism counts. Iran acts through its
proxy, Hezbollah; having tested and found Western powers tired and weak, it has
discovered what game theorists have long noted, that the world is vulnerable to freeriders, and to those who call the bluff of tough but insincere diplomatic talk. Iran is
betting on the prestige of nuclear weapons it has yet to complete; Syria has discovered
the difference a year makes in the will of international institutions. The worn-down Bush
administration appears to be sleepwalking through its remaining two years with the
blessing of its multilateralist partners; it wants nothing more than to pass along any
remaining foreign policy crises to the next administration. If Bush does act alone on Iran
or North Korea, we may be assured that this time it will not be willingly. No one,

apparently, has any time for idealism; neoconservative arguments over democracy and
freedom seem quite dead in the midst of this new Middle East war.
Fukuyama’s solution to this can better be described as ineffectual internationalism. This
version of idealism seems doomed from the outset to be heroically internationalist in
precisely the ways that most ensure its ineffectiveness. The effects can be seen in the
current inaction over Sudan. They were chronicled in the New York Times Magazine a
few months ago, in a profile of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
The international community will not prevent genocide in Darfur, the article argued, so
instead let us get on with preparing criminal trials for those we were unwilling to stop in
the first place. But, in this case, why should the ICC bother? Is it not morally corrupt to
stand and watch genocide go by, comforting oneself with a stern but vague promise to
arrest some people after it is over? This is an example of the vices both of
internationalism and realism. In the case of Iraq neoconservatives preferred war. Their
search for a quick and painless democratic transformation, which they did not find, was a
naive one. But their other belief was not so naive: this is the belief that over the long run,
the realist strategy of accommodation and containment of execrable regimes – the pursuit
of stability at all moral costs practised by the West for thirty years – would only serve to
feed the beast. In After the Neocons, Francis Fukuyama has analysed in exquisite and
sobering detail where that vision went wrong, where it is internally contradictory, and
where it draws on inapt historical parallels to refight the Cold War. His book is sharp and
shrewd, although ultimately not so devastating as he believes. The alternative he offers,
by contrast, so-called realistic Wilsonianism, merely prefers ineffectual internationalism.
Alas, in these difficult times, this is no alternative at all.
(Kenneth Anderson is research fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and
professor of law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC. He
is completing a book on global governance.)

